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Quantity discounts, characterised by unit prices falling as the quantity purchased rises, are a 
proliferate phenomenon that finds root in the economics of packaging.  This paper reviews the key 
economic foundations of nonlinear pricing, introduces new pricing data and conducts an empirical 
investigation into airfares and grocery prices, which are shown to exhibit quantity discounts of an 
identical order of magnitude.  The constancy of the quantity discount across distinct markets hints at 
the existence of a common force underlying the determination of prices. 
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Quantity discounts are widespread phenomena to be found in many markets, 
including the markets for groceries, illicit drugs, private school tuition, storage space 
and airline flights.  As the quantity purchased increases, price increases less than 
proportionally.  For example, a two-litre bottle of milk usually sells for less than twice 
the price of a one-litre carton.  At the heart of this relationship is a dynamic tension 
between cost economies and price discrimination, with far-reaching implications for 
efficiency in goods and services markets. 
 
The existence of quantity discounts can be attributed to several key reasons.   
Economies of scale in the production or retail of goods can be passed on to consumers 
in the form of discounts for bulk purchases.  Alternatively, as in illicit drug markets, a 
risk premium might be charged for smaller package sizes that exposes a dealer to 
more individuals (Clements and Zhao 2009).  Finally, quantity discounts could be 
explained by price discrimination, whereby the wholesaler or retailer exploits 
differences in the willingness-to-pay of different consumers. 
 
This paper introduces new data on ticket prices for airline flights and on grocery 
prices, both of which are shown to exhibit quantity discounts of a near identical order 
of magnitude.  Section II reviews the key economic foundations of nonlinear pricing.  
Section III introduces and employs an hedonic pricing model to estimate discounts in 
ticket prices for international flights from Perth, Australia.  Section IV extends the 
application of this model to grocery prices in Australian supermarkets.  Section V 
assesses the relationship between the size of the discount, the number of times the 








There are several key explanations for the existence of quantity discounts.  One 
explanation is price discrimination, where lower unit prices for larger quantities 
suggest that consumers of larger quantities have more elastic demand than consumers 
of smaller quantities.  For example, suppose that there are just two classes of 
consumer: large and small.  Producers maximise revenues by selling larger quantities 
at a lower price to the large-customer market, while also selling smaller quantities at a 
higher price to the small-customer market.  In this way, the producer is able to exploit 
more consumer surplus than allowed under a single-price scheme.  Effective price 
discrimination requires that the producer is able to segment the market and limit 
resale in order to reveal the consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay. 
 
To illustrate the mechanics of price discrimination and the role of the price elasticity, 
consider the allocation of seats between one-way and return passengers on a given 
flight.  Taking a one-way ticket as the base package size, we treat a return ticket as a 
larger package comprising two one-way components (outbound and inbound), so that 
if return is less than twice the price of one-way then quantity discounts exist.  As a    2 
 
return ticket is a package twice the size of one-way, let the package size s equal one 
for one-way and two for return.  For any given package size, define the unit price  s p  
as the price of the ticket  s p  divided by its size s, i.e.  s p p s s   .  Marginal revenue 
s MR  as a function of unit price and the price elasticity of demand  s η  is therefore 
  s s s η p MR 1 1   , where  2   , 1  s .  Equalising the marginal revenues for one-way 
and return gives       2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 η p η p       where 1 p  and  1   are,  respectively,  the 
unit price and price elasticity of one-way; likewise for  2  s .  Rearranging gives the 
ratio of the price elasticities: 
 













where  0 , 2 1     and  0 , 2 1    p p .  Thus, if the demand for one-way is less elastic than 
for return  1 2 1     and airlines price discriminate, then unit one-way must be more 
expensive than unit return  1 1 2    p p , provided that the demand for one-way and 
return are both price elastic  1 2 1   ,η η .  Equation (1) is a useful tool that yields key 
insights into the mechanics of price discrimination and the relationship between unit 




Another explanation for quantity discounts are economies of scale on the supply side.  
Lower unit costs in the production of larger package or pack sizes
1 may be passed on 
as discounts for larger purchases.  This can include cost economies in the use of 
packaging material.  For example, consider a hypothetical grocery product packaged 
in a sphere, where the volume of this sphere equates to the quantity of the product and 
the surface area reflects the amount of packaging material used.  The volume of a 
sphere  s and its surface area a defined as a function of its radius r  are 

3 π 3 4 r s  and
2 π 4 r a  , respectively, where  142 . 3 π  .  Thus, the volume of a 
sphere is proportional to r
3 while its surface area is proportional to r
2, showing that, 
for a given change in radius, the change in volume exceeds the change in surface area. 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the key nonlinear relationship between volume and surface area 
when moving from a smaller to a larger spherical package.  Let the small sphere have 
a volume  0 s  and a radius  0 r , defined as the linear distance from point A to point B.  
Moving from the smaller to the larger package, we enlarge this sphere so that the 
volume expands to  s s s    0 1  and the radius  r r r    0 1  is now the linear distance 
between point A and point C.  The change in surface area as a function of volume is 







0 1 π 4 3 π 4 ) ( s s s a    , so the surface area is nonlinear in s.  
Alternatively, the change in surface area with respect to a change in volume is 
 
                                                 
1 Package size refers to the range of sizes for a given container, e.g. from small to large.  Pack size 
incorporates multiples of containers usually packaged together, e.g. singles, doubles, half-dozens and 











where k is a constant.  Clearly, the amount (and cost) of packaging increases less than 
proportionally to an increase in product size.  For instance, expanding the size of a 
spherical package by 100% will double the amount (and cost) of product, but the 
surface area, and hence the cost of packaging material, increases by only ~59%
2.  
Such cost savings can be passed on as lower unit prices for larger packages. 
 
More generally, suppose that the packaging cost is α dollars per cm
2 and the product 
cost is β dollars per cm
3, then the total cost of the product c, as a function of the radius 
r and size s, is   s s r s r c     3 ) , (.   S i n c e    
3
1
4 3 ) (   s s r , the total cost expressed 





4 3 3 ) ( .  The elasticity of total cost with 
respect to size is therefore: 
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2 The nonlinear relationship between volume and surface area is not limited to spheres.  For example, 
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FIG. 1 — Geometry of spheres    4 
 
 
where γ is a positive fraction reflecting the share of packaging cost in the total cost.  
As the elasticity of total cost is a weighted average of two-thirds and one, its value 
must be smaller than one, so total cost increases less than proportionally to product 

























In many cases, economies of scale in physical packaging are too small to explain the 
size of prevailing discounts.  Moreover, the thickness of the packaging material might 
increase as the size (and weight) of the package increases, partially offsetting any cost 
economies.  However, it is useful to think of ‘packaging’ as referring to the sum of the 
value added at each step along a multistage supply chain.  In addition to physical 
packaging, there can also be cost economies at different stages throughout the supply 
chain, including in transport, storage, advertising, retail and administration.  For 
example, bulk freight shipments, the rental of storage space, advertising in a print 
catalogue, stacking shelves and processing at the checkout can all attract a lower per 
unit cost for larger package sizes than for smaller ones.  The sum of all cost 
economies on the supply side can amount to significant cost savings for larger 
packages, passed on as quantity discounts. 
 
We have heretofore examined quantity discounts from the producer’s perspective, but 
a demand-side investigation is also warranted.  Quantity discounts can also exist 
because consumers often have nonlinear costs.  Consumers who buy larger packages 
may have greater transport and storage costs and hence demand lower unit prices as 
compensation.  For example, the cost of carrying heavy grocery items and storing 
them in limited refrigerator space might be reflected in the discount for larger 
packages. Furthermore, consumers may also face a greater risk of wastage by 
purchasing larger package or, to a lesser extent, pack sizes (Fox and Melser 2007).  
For instance, a shopper who buys a large bottle of milk might run the risk of 
consuming only a portion before the remainder expires.  Such costs devalue large 
packages for consumers. 
 
Conversely, Gerstner and Hess (1987) suggest that bulk purchases entail fewer trips to 
the supermarket and less time spent shopping, thus reducing overall transport costs.  
This would suggest that there should in fact be surcharges for larger packages.  Also, 
studies by food psychologists have shown that consumers who buy larger packages 
tend to cook and consume more than they would otherwise do so (Gittins 2010).  This 
suggests that the risk of wastage is not nearly as great as it seems.  Hence, the net 





Another explanation for quantity discounts stems from the divisibility of packages.  If 
larger package sizes are exact integer multiples of smaller sizes, then quantity 
surcharges would ideally not occur as consumers can simply compose the larger size    5 
 
by buying several small packages
3.  Combined with a linear pricing scheme with no 
discounts or surcharges, the consumer’s choice of package size for a given product 
then becomes an unfettered function of their consumption rates and storage and 
transport costs.  Discounts for larger packages can therefore entice consumers to buy 
larger packages than under a linear pricing scheme.  Moreover, high unit prices for 
smaller packages can act as a ‘decoy’ price that makes larger packages more attractive 
by appearing to offer significantly better value.  This would reasonably assume that 
consumers are unsure about a product’s true value without first comparing it to 
similar products (Ariely 2009). 
 
Temptation and Self-Control 
 
Another explanation for quantity discounts relates to temptation and self-control.   
Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum (2007) extend the work of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) 
on  temptation preferences with self-control.  Firms can capitalise on consumer 
‘preference reversals’ — where consumers actions systematically deviate from stated 
intentions — either by leading consumers into temptation or lowering utility costs 
incurred from self-control.  For example, consider a car dealership.  Some consumers 
know that upon entering the dealership and test-driving a range of models, they may 
be tempted to purchase a more expensive, higher quality model than originally 
intended.  Some completely succumb to temptation and purchase the tempting model, 
while others buy the model originally intended, but have to exercise self-control in the 
process.  Furthermore, some consumers partially succumb to temptation, 
compromising between the tempting model and their original intentions, perhaps by 
adding optional features to the model originally desired.  Conversely, some 
consumers may instead be tempted ‘downward’ to be overly frugal and buy a cheaper, 
lower quality car.  Those anticipating large self-control costs may choose not to enter 
the dealership at all. 
 
Esteban et al. find that if all consumers succumb to temptation, the monopolist’s 
optimal menu is a singleton.  Conversely, if some consumers are tempted downward, 
the monopolist may offer a continuum of choices and impose self-control costs.  This 
is because downward-tempted consumers prefer purchasing no bundle to purchasing 
the bundle offered in the singleton menu.  The monopolist must then lower the price 
of the bundle in the singleton menu and price discriminate.  Temptation and self-
control preferences could explain quantity discounts if some consumers are tempted 
downward to purchase smaller packages than originally intended.  Lower unit prices 
for larger packages might help alleviate large self-control costs.  Offering a range of 
package sizes with different unit prices can be a form of price discrimination that 
attempts to extract commitment surplus. 
 
                                                 
3 In reality, this is not always the case.  Consider the following example of quantity surcharging despite 
the perfect divisibility of packages (Freakonomics 2010).  Nathan’s, a hot dog restaurant in Coney 
Island, New York, charges $1.99 for one hot dog, $3.99 for two and $5.99 for three.  Here, the 
customer is charged one cent extra for every additional hot dog.  The astute customer can therefore buy 
two bundles of one hot dog each at a total cost of $3.98, saving a penny.  The existence of this pricing 
anomaly suggests that consumers: (a) incur disutility from carrying additional pennies; (b) value the 
utility cost or opportunity cost of correcting this anomaly at greater than a penny; or, most likely, (c) 
are unaware of the anomaly.  The widespread prominence of prices ending in 99 cents suggests that this 
practice is effective in its goal of making products appear cheaper.  It can also disguise the presence of 
quantity surcharges, which are a sign of price discrimination (Mills 2002).    6 
 
Modelling Price and Package Size 
 
The size and character of quantity discounts yield useful insights into the relationship 
between price and package size.  Several approaches have been proposed to examine 
this price-size relationship (Telser 1978; Clements 2006).  One approach to package 
pricing is suggested by Caulkins and Padman (1993).  Let there exist a log-linear 
relationship between price and package size, 
 
  , ln β α ln s p    (5)
 
where p is the price, s is the package size, α is an intercept and β is the size elasticity.  
The size elasticity reflects the percentage change in price in response to a percentage 
change in quantity.  This implies that price as a function of size is 
 
  , ) (
  as s p  (6)
 
where ) α exp(  a .  Assume that a given product can be purchased in two package 
sizes,  1  s  and  n s  , where n is larger than one by a factor of n.  These packages 
have prices  ) 1 ( p  and  ) (n p  respectively.  Suppose we split the product of size n by a 
factor of n so that there are now n packages, each with size  1  s .  The total revenue 
from these n packages is therefore  ) 1 ( p n .  Let the markup factor δ be the ratio of 
this revenue to the revenue from the larger package of size n, so that   ) ( ) 1 ( δ n p p n  , 
or ) ( δ ) 1 ( n p p n    .  Also, let  1    be a conversion factor that converts the larger 
package  s into the smaller one   s , so that  n   .  We then have the following 
general relationship between prices, package sizes and the markup and conversion 
factors: 
 
  ) (s p
s







  . (7)
 
To derive an expression for the size elasticity β as a function of the markup and 
conversion factors δ and  , we modify equation (6) so that 
    s a s p .  
Therefore equation (7) becomes   
        as s a , or    








1.  ( 8 )
 
Here, the size elasticity β falls with the markup δ and rises with the conversion 
factor.  If there is no markup then  1    and the size elasticity  1    so that price is 
proportional to package size and there are no quantity discounts.  If  1    then price is 
less than proportional to package size and discounts prevail.  The greater the 
conversion factor , the more a product can be divided and the higher the total profit.  
In equation (8), the conversion factor normalises by deflating the markup so that the 
size elasticity reflects a net effect.  Equation (8) yields useful insights into the 
relationship between price and package size and the influence of the structural 
parameters δ and .    7 
 
 
Evidence from Drug Markets 
 
Research into Australian marijuana prices, purchased in two package sizes, ounces 
and grams, has shown that marijuana is subject to substantive quantity discounts 
(Clements 2006).  For marijuana leaf, heads and a combination of the two, prices 
were estimated to have a size elasticity β of around 0.75, implying that a 10% increase 
in package size produces a 7.5% increase in price or, alternatively, a 2.5% fall in the 
unit price.  Similar estimates of the size elasticity were shown to hold for other illicit 
drugs, including heroin, methamphetamines and crack (Brown and Silverman 1974; 
Caulkins and Padman 1993).  How well does this relationship between price and 
package size apply to other markets?  The following sections extend this analysis to 





This section introduces airfare pricing data for international flights from Perth, 
Australia, and these prices are shown to have substantial quantity discounts.  A 
sample of flights to 95 different destinations was collected for May 2010.  For each 
destination, both the one-way and roundtrip prices were collected, yielding a total of 
190 2 95   observations.  The methodology of data collection is discussed in 
Appendix A.  The prices are tabulated in Appendix B. 
 
When considering airline ticket pricing, we treat a return ticket as a package 
comprising two distinct one-way components.  We take a one-way trip as the base 
unit, so halving the price of a return ticket derives the equivalent one-way price.  If, 
for a given route, the unit price of a return ticket equals the unit price of one-way, 
then linear pricing prevails.  If, however, unit return is less than unit one-way, then 
quantity discounts occur.  Fig. 2 plots unit return against unit one-way for the sample.  
As almost all points lie below the 45º ray, it is clear that quantity discounts abound: of 
the 95 observations collected, 93 have discounts.  The average discount is 
approximately 26%, so the unit price of a return ticket is around 74% of the price of a 
one-way ticket.  To what extent does package size influence the unit price? 
 
The Discount Elasticity 
 
Clements (2006) introduces the discount elasticity as a measure of the percentage 
change in unit price relative to a percentage change in package size.  We now derive 
and estimate the discount elasticity for our sample of flights.  Equation (5) gives the 
log-linear relationship between price and package size, where β is the size elasticity.  
To compare between products with different package sizes, it is preferable to express 
this relationship in terms of unit prices.  Accordingly, let i i i s p p   , where  n i  1   
types of the product, so that  1  s  for one-way and  2  s  for roundtrip for flights to a 
given destination i.  Subtracting  s ln  from equation (5) gives the core relationship 
between unit price and package size: 
    8 
 
  i i s p ln ln      , (9) 
 
where 1       is the discount elasticity, which measures the responsiveness of a 
change in unit price relative to a change in size.  If quantity discounts exist, then the 
size elasticity  1    and the discount elasticity  0   .  By using unit prices, equation 
(9) both enables direct comparisons across package sizes and introduces the discount 
elasticity as a convenient measure of the quantity discount. 
 
Taking equation (9) as a regression equation applied to airfare pricing, we treat a one-
way trip to a given destination i as the base ‘package size’, while treating the return 
trip, which comprises two types of flight (outbound and inbound), as a larger package, 
so that  1  s  for one-way and  2  s  for roundtrip.  Furthermore, it is useful to control 
for other variables, such as the geographic location of the destination, the airline 
flown and seasonal demand.  Thus, we transform equation (9) into the following 
hedonic pricing equation: 
 
  i i i s p         dummies season  and/or  carrier    region,   , hemisphere ln ln , (10)
 
where  i   is an error term.  Equation (10) extends equation (9) by interacting with a 



















Return = 0.74 × One-Way
FIG. 2 — Unit prices: Return and one-way airfares ($A)    9 
 
The estimates for six regression equations are presented in table 1.  The estimate of  
for all equations is around –0.37, although the standard errors vary with the equation.  
Column 1 includes a southern hemisphere dummy, estimated with a negative 
coefficient, implying that on average flights to the southern hemisphere are cheaper 
than flights to the northern hemisphere.  The geographical location of the destination 
of the outbound flight can account for much of the variation in the sample, reflected in 
the high goodness-of-fit R
2 of the equation in column 2.  Estimates of the coefficients 
of carrier dummies are given in column 3.  The strong goodness-of-fit of the equation 
in column 4 suggests that regional and carrier dummies together account for most of 
the variability in prices.  For the equation in column 4, the estimated discount 
elasticity is –0.37 with a standard error of 0.04.  Finally, whether a season is peak, 
shoulder or off-peak can account for some variation in price (columns 5-6).  The 
TABLE 1  Airline Pricing Equations 
 Equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indep.  Variable  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant α  7.248 (.051)  7.410 (.053)  6.905 (.122)  7.273 (.094) 7.071 (.100) 6.693 (.149)
Log s, β'  –.365 (.098)  –.365 (.055)  –.365 (.071)  –.365 (.041) –.365 (.097) –.365 (.068)
Dummy variables        
H e m i s p h e r e :         
Southern  –.174  (.082)       
R e g i o n :         
Europe    –.114 (.060)    –.022 (.059)    
New Zealand    –.988 (.091)    –1.112 (.092)    
South America    .309 (.091)    .234 (.073)    
North America    .180 (.065)    .059 (.065)    
Asia    –.747 (.065)    –.483 (.067)    
C a r r i e r :         
Air Canada      1.096 (.267)  .669 (.167)   1.146 (.256)
Air New Zealand     –.138 (.169)  .314 (.126)   .034 (.175)
Alitalia     .291  (.267)  –.054 (.160)   .141 (.260)
American Air.      .778 (.150)  .351 (.107)   .828 (.144)
British Airways      .478 (.182)  .125 (.113)   .328 (.182)
Cathay Pacific      .601 (.267)  .174 (.167)   .651 (.256)
Emirates     .607  (.134)  .216 (.090)   .583 (.132)
Garuda Indonesia     –.729 (.207)  –.614 (.121)   –.679 (.199)
Lufthansa      .567 (.141)  .222 (.091)   .417 (.144)
Malaysia Air.      –.068 (.136)  –.275 (.083)   –.156 (.134)
Royal Brunei Air.     –.564 (.267)  –.449 (.156)   –.514 (.256)
Singapore Air.      .118 (.133)  .002 (.079)   .109 (.127)
South African Air.    .578 (.182)  .210 (.123)   .428 (.182)
Qantas     .384  (.136)  .208 (.094)   .447 (.139)
S e a s o n :         
Peak      .044  (.108) .162  (.097)
Shoulder       .261  (.106) .363  (.096)
R
2  .089    .721    .562    .855     .122  .603 
SEE  .469   .263   .338   .197 .462  .323 
No. of obs.  190  190         190          190        190           190   
 
NOTE: Regression equations are i i i s p         dummies season  and/or  carrier    region,   , hemisphere ln ln .  The northern 
hemisphere is the base for the hemisphere dummies, Africa is the base for the regional dummies, Thai Airways is the base for the 
airline carrier dummies and off-peak is the base for the season dummies.    10 
 
discount elasticity of –0.37 implies that doubling the package size by transforming a 




The estimate of  37 .      clearly indicates the presence of substantial quantity 
discounts for international airfares.  What could explain such discounts?  One 
possibility is that discounts reflect savings in administration costs.  For example, 
lower unit prices for roundtrip tickets could reflect cost savings in the form of fewer 
entries recorded in an airline’s computer system, or the use of a single booking 
reference.  However, such cost economies are relatively nominal and unlikely to 
explain the size of the discounts observed.  A second possibility is that airlines offer 
discounts in order to secure the roundtrip fare upfront.  There is little evidence, 
however, to suggest that this policy forms the basis of fare pricing. 
 
A third and more potent explanation is that airlines offer discounts in order to 
guarantee selling a seat on the return trip.  Airlines use advanced probabilistic yield 
management techniques to price discriminate between different classes of traveller 
(see Belobaba 1987, 1989; Botimer and Belobaba 1999).  This is done by allocating a 
fixed number of seats at different prices to each class of traveller.  Airlines might then 
offer high-fare seats to one-way customers and low-fare seats to roundtrip customers 
in order to encourage the purchase of roundtrip tickets, securing seats on the return 
flight.  Discounts may be larger if there are many choice substitutes available for the 
return trip, e.g. competing airlines or alternate transport options by land or sea (Brons 
et al. 2002).  
 
Finally, quantity discounts in airfares could reflect price discrimination.  Airlines may 
capitalise on differing price elasticities between, say, business travellers and leisure 
travellers.  Leisure travellers, assumed to have free time and flexible travel schedules, 
and hence relatively elastic price elasticities of demand, are likely to plan their 
journey in advance, adjusting their travel dates to book the cheapest return tickets 
available.  Conversely, business travellers with inflexible work schedules may have 
relatively inelastic price elasticities.  For example, business travellers may need to fly 
on very short notice for a meeting or to conduct negotiations, with an uncertain date 
or time of return, and do not want their trip to be constrained by a return ticket.  
Booking separate one-way tickets affords the most flexibility to productivity-
maximising travellers with high opportunity costs of time.  Furthermore, business 
travellers may make multiple stops to different destinations, buying a string of one-
way tickets with the return flight departing from elsewhere.  In contrast, leisure 
travellers might buy a return ticket to a fixed destination, travelling on land to 
different locations before returning to the original destination.  This could imply that 
the proportion of business travellers buying roundtrip tickets relative to one-way is 
not as great as for leisure travellers, thus encouraging airlines to offer discounts on 
return tickets. 
 
Do roundtrip travellers have more elastic demand than one-way travellers?  Recall 
equation (1), which gives the ratio of the price elasticities for one-way and roundtrip.  
Given our estimate that the price of a unit return ticket is approximately three-quarters 
of the price of unit one-way, i.e. 4 3 74 . 0 1 2     p p , we derive expressions for the    11 
 
respective price elasticities, viz.    2 2 1 3 4       and    1 1 2 4 3      .  From these 
expressions, it can be determined that the demand for one-way is less elastic than for 
roundtrip, i.e.  1 2 1    .  For example, if  5 . 1 2   η  so that  3 . 1 5 . 4 6 1      η , then 
1 8 . 0 2 1    η η  and one-way is relatively inelastic.  This holds true provided that one-
way and roundtrip are both price elastic, which implies that marginal revenue is 
greater than zero (    1     0 1 1        η η p MR s s s ).  This is not unreasonable given 
the airline policy of overbooking flights (Smith, Leimkuhler and Darrow 1992).  Thus 
it appears that roundtrip travellers have more elastic demand than one-way travellers.  





We have shown that airfare pricing is subject to significant quantity discounts and that 
the discount elasticity, which measures the elasticity of unit price relative to package 
size, is around –0.37.  In this section, we extend our analysis of quantity discounts to 
grocery pricing in Australian supermarkets. 
 
A survey of the grocery prices of Australian supermarket giant Coles was conducted 
in September 2010, in which we collected a sample of 117 grocery products with a 
total of 53 different package sizes, yielding a total of 258 observations
4.  The sample 
can be divided into three broad categories: shelf groceries, frozen goods and 
refrigerated goods (dairy products).  These broad categories can be sub-divided into a 
total of 23 distinct product groups, ranging from baking agents to cheese slices.  The 
estimates of the parameters of our hedonic pricing model with product dummies are 
presented in table 2.  The equation in column 1 is a regression of uncooled shelf 
groceries, yielding an estimated discount elasticity of –0.46.  Frozen goods have 
almost no discounts, with an estimated discount elasticity of around –0.05 (column 2).  
The discount elasticity for dairy goods alone is around –0.39 (column 3).  From these 
three estimates, it is apparent that the size of the quantity discount varies considerably 
with product category.  The discount elasticity for the entire sample is –0.37 with a 
standard error of 0.04 (column 4), which implies that on average a 10% increase in 
package size leads to a 3.7% fall in unit price.  The estimate of –0.37 for grocery 




The results clearly indicate the presence of significant quantity discounts for 
supermarket groceries, although the size of the discount varies between products.   
What could account for this variation? 
 
One explanation is that the size of the quantity discount is influenced, partly or wholly, 
by storage costs.  Recall the geometric properties of packaging discussed in section II, 
where it was shown that the surface area of an object increases less than 
proportionally to its volume.  For products that require cooling, larger packages have 
higher per-unit storage costs than smaller packages.  This is because larger packages 
                                                 
4 Details of the methodology used to collect grocery prices are provided in Appendix A.  The prices are 
tabulated in Appendix B.    12 
 
have less surface area per unit of volume available for the transfer of heat than do 
smaller packages.  Thus, the time per unit needed to cool a given sized product 
decreases as its surface area increases (Ozisik 1968).  For example, a pack of four 
small apple pies with a total weight of 500g cools to a given temperature more rapidly 
than a pack of a single large 500g apple pie.  Consumers who place a higher value per 
unit on larger packages, due to savings in transportation or handling costs, will also 
pay a premium reflecting the additional storage costs borne by the retailer.  Walden 
(2008), in an empirical survey of supermarket products, found that refrigerated and 
frozen goods have smaller discounts than goods that do not require cooling, 
attributing this to the aforementioned interaction between physical packaging and 
refrigeration.  Our results are consistent with this relationship: our estimate of the 
discount elasticity for frozen goods (–0.05) is substantially lower than for refrigerated 
goods (–0.39), which in turn have a smaller elasticity than uncooled goods (–0.46).  
TABLE 2  Grocery Pricing Equations 
      
 
Shelf Groceries Frozen  Dairy  Shelf Groceries, 
Frozen & Dairy
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Independent Variable  Coefficient     Coefficient     Coefficient     Coefficient 
Constant α  .735 (.126) .864 (.193) 1.438 (.083) 1.436 (.098)
Log s, β'  –.455 (.067) –.051 (.056) –.387 (.049) –.366 (.037)
Product dummies 
Shelf groceries: 
Baking agents  –.772 (.251) –1.648 (.240)
Bread mixes  –.399 (.195) –1.397 (.204)
Breadcrumbs –1.090  (.180) –1.953  (.188)
Cooking chocolate  .282 (.263) –.470 (.231) 
Dried fruits & nuts  .039 (.081) –.779 (.119)
Biscuits .001  (.187) –.790  (.180)
Cereal  –.857 (.123)
Frozen: 
Carrots & corn  –1.500 (.146) –1.446 (.170)
Mixed vegetables  –1.504 (.146) –1.459 (.170)
Peas & beans  –1.674 (.142) –1.630 (.159)
Other vegetables  –.977 (.191) –1.168 (.234)
Convenience meals  –.850 (.151) –.714 (.194)
Fish & seafood  –.404 (.148) –.392 (.168)
Party snacks  –.697 (.176) –.617 (.242)
Pies & pasties  –1.135 (.156) –1.245 (.163)
Pastry –1.612  (.173) –1.384  (.247)
Poultry  .263 (.249)
Dairy - Cheese: 
Blocks & wedges  –.451 (.114) –.482 (.119)
Cottage & cream  –.754 (.133) –.778 (.149)
Gourmet & specialty  –.148 (.113) –.162 (.130)
Grated –.420  (.119) –.443  (.132)
Slices –.681  (.121) –.709  (.130)
R
2  .654 .917 .726 .803 
SEE .348 .173 .250 .294
No. of observations  105  44  109   258 
 
NOTE: Regression equation is i i i s p         dummies product  ln ln .  Cereal is the base for shelf groceries, poultry is the 
base for frozen products and snack size cheese is the base for both the dairy regression and the complete regression.    13 
 




V.  The Discount Elasticity and the Markup and Conversion Factors 
 
Estimating the Markup 
 
We can determine the markup factor given the conversion factor and our estimates of 
the discount elasticity.  Recall equation (8), which expresses the size elasticity in 
terms of the markup and conversion factors.  Transforming equation (8) into an 
expression for the discount elasticity, where the discount elasticity and size elasticity 
are related by  1     , gives       ln ln .  For airlines,  37 .    and  2   , so 
that the markup factor    29 . 1 2 ln 37 . 0 exp     , implying that there is a 29% 
markup in transforming a return ticket into two one-way tickets.  Similarly for grocery 
prices, 37 .      and the average conversion factor  51 . 2   , so that the average 
markup is   40 . 1 51 . 2 ln 37 . 0 exp     , or 40%, when dividing grocery products into 
smaller packages
5.  These estimates appear reasonable. 
 
The Discount Elasticity and the Conversion Factor 
 
We have in the preceding sections determined that airfares and grocery prices are 
subject to quantity discounts of a similar order of magnitude.  The constancy of our 
estimate of the discount elasticity  37 . 0      (or the size elasticity 63 . 0   ) is an 
intriguing result that could reflect the influence of core forces underlying the 
interaction between price and package size, holding true even across starkly different 
markets.  However, our estimates differ notably from previous similar empirical 
studies.  For example, recall from section II that marijuana prices are estimated to 
have a size elasticity of  75 . 0   , which implies a discount elasticity of  25 . 0    .  
What could explain this discrepancy? 
 
One possibility is that the price of smaller marijuana packages incorporates an 
additional risk premium to compensate for a dealer’s exposure to more individuals 
(see Clements and Zhao 2009).  Another possibility is that the discount elasticity is 
nonlinear in the conversion factor.  Our analysis of airlines involves two package 
sizes, one-way and roundtrip, whereby in transforming a roundtrip ticket into a one-
way ticket, we halve the package size, i.e.  2   .  Similarly, of the 141 conversion 
factors in our grocery sample, over half also have a conversion factor  2    and 71% 
have a conversion factor of two or smaller.  On the other hand, the discount elasticity 
for marijuana prices is determined by converting ounces into grams, which means 
dividing the larger package by a factor of  28   .  The difference in the conversion 
factor could explain the discrepancy between the discount elasticity for airlines and 
groceries and the discount elasticity for marijuana.  The discount elasticity could 
diminish as the conversion factor increases — a relationship that is not inconsistent 
with the predictions of our model.  Clearly, the discount elasticity       ln ln  falls 
in absolute terms as the conversion factor rises, provided that the markup factor is 
                                                 
5 More precise values than shown are used in the calculation of the markup factors.    14 
 
either constant or increases less than proportionally to an increase in the conversion 
factor, i.e. 1 d d    .  Our results could suggest that the size of the discount elasticity 
falls as the difference between the sizes of the product increases. 
 
 
VI. Concluding  Comments   
 
Quantity discounts, characterised by unit prices declining as the quantity purchased 
increases, are puzzling phenomena to be found in a broad range of diverse markets.  
This paper has reviewed the key economic foundations of nonlinear pricing, 
introduced new pricing data and conducted an empirical investigation into airfares 
and grocery prices, which are shown to exhibit substantial quantity discounts.  The 
discount elasticity β' , which measures the percentage change in unit price relative to a 
percentage change in package size, is estimated to be around –0.37 for both airfares 
and grocery prices.  This implies that a 10% increase in package size produces a 6.3% 
increase in price or, alternatively, a 3.7% fall in the unit price.  These results are 
contrasted against those of the existing literature and it is suggested that the size of the 
discount elasticity could diminish as the difference between the sizes of the product 
increases.  While there is notable dispersion in the distribution of the underlying 
elasticities for groceries, which can be attributed at least in part to differences in 
storage costs, the constancy of the discount elasticity across the two distinct markets 
considered in this paper is an intriguing pattern that could reflect the presence of key 
fundamental forces underscoring the relationship between price and package size, 
pervading across starkly different markets.  This article has also served to highlight 
the central importance of the economics of packaging, and the inherent tension 
between cost economies and price discrimination, to the existence of discounts.  The 
extent to which price discrimination accounts for the quantity discount yields insight 
into the degree of market power exerted by producers and the degree to which 





Methodology of Data Collection — Airfares 
 
In compiling airfare data, certain limiting rules were adopted.  All prices are for international economy 
flights from Perth, Australia, inclusive of taxes and surcharges.  Taxes and surcharges are included 
because consumers price taxes and surcharges into their consumption decisions.  The initial dataset 
includes one-way and roundtrip prices for 95 flights from Perth to various destinations worldwide.  
Data was collected over March and April 2010 for flights departing Perth on Monday 3 May returning 
on Monday 10 May or, when no flights were available, on the nearest available dates.  For each 
destination, the airline offering the cheapest one-way economy ticket was chosen.  The price of this 
ticket was then matched against the price of a return ticket with the same airline. 
 
Low-cost carriers, such as Air Asia, Jetstar and Virgin Atlantic, have been excluded from the dataset 
because each leg of a trip with stopovers had to be booked separately, i.e. a flight is not available as 
one complete package.  For example, a one-way Air Asia flight from Perth to London has to be booked 
separately for Perth to Kuala Lumpur and from Kuala Lumpur to London.  Furthermore, there are often 
no quantity discounts with low-cost carriers. 
 
Data was collected directly from airline websites as the fares quoted by travel websites are often 
problematic.  There are many travel websites and ‘online travel agencies’ that conveniently search 
across databases or airline websites to find the lowest fares for given search parameters.  Search 
parameters such as origin, destination, dates and fare class are inputted into these websites, which then    15 
 
quote corresponding fare prices offered by different airlines, ranked cheapest first.  Initially, research 
data was sourced from several travel websites, including FlightCentre.com.au, Webjet.com.au and 
Expedia.com.au.  There are also several metasearch sites — such as Kayak.com, Sidestep.com and 
Yahoo Farechase — that search across a multiplicity of travel websites.  These metasearch sites are 
intended to call upon larger data sources to yield more robust search results. 
 
However, there are several problems with the use of online travel agencies and metasearch sites.   
Firstly, there is a lack of consistency in the quoted fares between such sites.  A search across Flight 
Centre, Webjet and Expedia does not always return the same prices and may even yield different airline 
rankings in order of affordability.  Furthermore, the ticket prices quoted by these sites are almost 
always different (usually cheaper) to those quoted directly by airline websites.  On occasion, the data is 
entirely unreliable.  For example, a search with Flight Centre for a return flight from Perth to Lilongwe, 
Malawi priced a British Airways flight at around $4,454, inclusive of taxes of -$22,096.  Given the 
highly disputable prices cited by travel agent websites, sourcing data directly from airline websites is a 
more reliable approach. 
 
Other problems with the use of online travel agencies and metasearch sites emerge from the inadequacy 
of the information given by these sites.  For example, when neither a single airline nor its codeshare 
partners fly the entire route from origin to destination, travel websites will then often ‘mix and match’ 
different airlines that do not have existing codeshare agreements.  This is problematic for comparative 
analysis because the fare quoted does not represent a single cohesive package.  For example, when 
airlines are mixed and matched, there is no streamlining of baggage and handling processes on flights 
with multiple stopovers.  Some travel websites explicitly disclose when separate airlines have been 
combined, but others do not.  For example, Flight Centre lists the total ticket price and the first airline 
flown along the route, but it does not disclose whether this airline has been combined with others to 
complete different legs of the journey.  This has been confirmed by checking directly against individual 
airline websites, which explicitly state that they do not offer flights on the route in question.  In our 
dataset, multiple airlines are not used unless airlines have already entered into a codeshare agreement.  
This lack of transparency is another reason why a direct search with airlines is preferred to using travel 
agent websites. 
 
Another complication stems from the multiplicity of economy fare classes, which is not disclosed on 
travel agent websites.  Different ‘grades’ of economy class, and sometimes business or first class, are 
offered, each with varying terms and conditions.  For example, Qantas offers four grades within 
economy class: Red e-Deal, Super Saver, Flexi Saver and Fully Flexible.  The restrictiveness or 
generosity of the economy ticket with regard to penalties for cancellation or date change, frequent flyer 
points earned, eligibility for upgrades, stopover allowances, payment deadlines etc. are contingent upon 
the grade purchased.  Greater flexibility generally attracts a premium above the base ticket price, and so 
is an important variable to be controlled when comparing one-way with roundtrip prices.  For example, 
for a return economy ticket from Perth to London, Qantas might offer Red e-Deal as the cheapest fare 
class for both outbound and inbound flights.  However, for a one-way flight, the cheapest fare class 
might be Super Saver.  In such a situation, we opted to use Super Saver as the basis for fare comparison 
across both one-way and roundtrip.  In contrast, travel agent websites do not disclose the fare grade, 
citing only the cheapest price available regardless of ticket flexibility.  As such, a manual search with 
individual airline websites, with full disclosure of all terms and conditions, was adopted in preference 
to travel agent websites. 
 
Methodology of Data Collection — Grocery Prices 
 
Grocery pricing data was collected in March and September from the Shop Online feature of the Coles 
supermarket website (coles.com.au).  Coles Shop Online provides a comprehensive list of stock that 
can be delivered to the home.  However, the prices offered online are at a premium to the prices listed 
on the shelf.  As there is no explicit delivery fee, the premium charged presumably reflects a delivery 
surcharge, and is in the order of 7-9% of the shelf price.  Also, as a postcode must be entered in order 
to access the Shop Online feature, the author selected 6151 for South Perth, Western Australia.  Ideally, 
the choice of suburb would not impact on the prices offered, particularly as Coles has adopted a policy 
of charging uniform prices throughout Australia, regardless of geographical location.  It is not clear, 
however, whether the choice of suburb impacts on the delivery surcharge incorporated into the prices 
offered online.  Nonetheless, as the delivery surcharge is constant across all package sizes, it does not 




TABLE A.1  Airfares from Perth, 2010 
   Destination  Unit Price ($A)  Log 
Discount        Destination  Unit Price ($A)  Log 
Discount 
    One Way  Return          One Way Return   
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)          (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
                               
I. EUROPE    IV. NORTH AMERICA 
                     
1.  London  1088 944 -14.21    43.  Honolulu  871 805  -7.87 
2. Rome  1224  943  -26.00   44. Los  Angeles  1366  1319  -3.47 
3. Paris  1140  986  -14.50   45. New  York  1510  1463  -3.13 
4. Dublin  1207  1189  -1.45   46. Miami  2310  1413  -49.18 
5. Frankfurt  1155  930  -21.68   47. San  Francisco  1335  1346  0.82 
6. Amsterdam  1088  901  -18.89   48. Toronto  2769  1472  -63.20 
7. Athens  1078  895  -18.65   49. Vancouver  1785  1436  -21.75 
8. Edinburgh  1201  1044  -13.93   50. Mexico  City  2565  1304  -67.60 
9. Manchester  1235  1046  -16.56   51. Chicago  2213  1599  -32.52 
10. Vienna  1495  926  -47.88   52. Las  Vegas  2142  1511  -34.90 
11. Barcelona  1155  1122  -2.87   53. Edmonton  2105  1711  -20.75 
12. Berlin  1868  1472  -23.84   54. Ottawa  2023  1620  -22.20 
13. Bern  1787  1336  -29.09   55. Victoria  3241  2145  -41.29 
14. Bratislava  1725  1373  -22.84   56. Montgomery  2831  2796  -1.25 
15. Bucharest  1768  1323  -28.99   57. Denver  2158  1648  -26.93 
16. Budapest  1768  1323  -29.00   58. Springfield  1272  1709  29.56 
17. Copenhagen  1187  1162  -2.06   59. Boston  2293  1643  -33.34 
18. Helsinki  1725  1091  -45.79   60. Nashville  2245  1614  -33.00 
19. Lisbon  1769  1294  -31.24   61. Austin  2039  1607  -23.78 
20. Luxembourg  City  1763  1161  -41.76             
21. Madrid  1498  1338  -11.31       Mean     -23.99 
22. Nicosia  1496  926  -47.99             
23. Prague  1292  1075  -18.47   V. ASIA 
24. Riga  1918  1384  -32.62              
25. Sofia  1868  1123  -50.90   62. Tokyo  (Narita)  792  767  -3.15 
26. Stockholm  1769  1298  -30.96   63. Hong  Kong  702  674  -4.13 
27. Tallinn  1936  1402  -32.30   64. Singapore  469  387  -19.10 
28. Vilnius  1912  1392  -31.74   65. Taipei  797  762  -4.49 
29. Warsaw  1768  1300  -30.78   66. Seoul  855  828  -3.17 
30. Zurich  1187  1169  -1.53   67. Manila  590  422  -33.52 
           68.  Bangkok  610 594  -2.66 
  Mean     -24.66   69. Yangon  697  659  -5.66 
           70.  Jakarta  485 372 -26.57 
II. NEW ZEALAND    71. Denpasar  485  372  -26.57 
           72.  Kuala  Lumpur  463 379 -20.14 
31.  Auckland  490 471  -4.04    73.  Beijing  760 633 -18.29 
32.  Wellington  516 497  -3.80    74.  Kathmandu  860 832  -3.24 
33.  Christchurch  570 573  0.48    75.  Delhi  798 660 -19.02 
34. Hamilton  531  525  -1.08   76. Istanbul  1187  1155  -2.72 
35.  Dunedin  595 589  -0.96    77.  Islamabad  919 808 -12.83 
36. Invercargill  592  576  -2.72   78. Damascus  1593  1076  -39.27 
           79.  Hanoi  742 709  -4.46 
  Mean     -2.02   80. Phnom  Penh  680  548  -21.54 
          81. Riyadh  1080  1047  -3.07 
III. SOUTH AMERICA              
              Mean     -13.68 
37. Buenos  Aires  2121  1493  -35.13             
38.  Rio de Janeiro  3175  1869  -52.97   VI.  AFRICA 
39. Santiago  2564  1164  -79.00             
40. Lima  2977  2087  -35.52   82. Johannesburg  922  778  -16.92 
41. Quito  2960  1463  -70.50   83. Cape  Town  922  778  -16.92 
42. Sao  Paulo  1788  1382  -25.72   84. Bloemfontein  2041  1637  -22.06 
           85. Harare  2149  1101  -66.88 
  Mean     -49.81   86. Nairobi  2016  1068  -63.49 
           87. Lilongwe  2149  1115  -65.59 
           88. Cairo  1562  1203  -26.16 
          89.  Algiers  1868  1120  -51.11 
          90.  Luanda  2245  1732  -25.96 
          91.  Gaborone  1788  1165  -42.85 
          92.  Abidjan  2310  1786  -25.69 
          93.  Entebbe  2016  1085  -61.93    17 
 
          94.  Lusaka  2149  1097  -67.21 
          95.  Mauritius  2246  1159  -66.15 
                     
              Mean     -44.21 
                     
              Grand Mean     -25.25 
                                
NOTE: Log discount = 100 × logarithmic ratio 
 
TABLE A.2  Grocery Prices, Coles, 2010 
Product Type  Product  Obs.  Size 
(grams)  Price  Unit Price 
(per 100g)
(1) (2)      (3)  (4)  (5) 
Shelf Groceries           
Baking Agents  1.  McKenzie's Bicarbonate Soda  1.  500  2.04  0.41
     2.  1,000  3.84  0.38
Bread Mix  2.  Laucke Bread Mix White Crusty  3.  600  2.50  0.42
     4.  2,400  8.16  0.34
     5.  10,000  21.78  0.22
  3.  Laucke Bread Mix Wholemeal  6.  2,400  8.16  0.34
     7.  5,000  13.07  0.26
Breadcrumbs 4.  Anchor  Breadcrumbs  8.  375  1.90  0.51
     9.  750  2.51  0.33
  5.  Coles Smart Buy Breadcrumbs  10.  500  1.36  0.27
     11.  1,000  1.94  0.19
Cooking Chocolate  6.  Cadbury Bournville Cocoa  12.  125  2.67  2.14
     13.  250  5.33  2.13
Dried Fruits & Nuts  7.  McKenzie's Coconut Desiccated  14.  250  2.01  0.80
     15.  500  3.60  0.72
  8.  Angas Park Prunes Pitted  16.  250  3.63  1.45
     17.  500  6.86  1.37
  9.  Coles Dates Pitted  18.  250  1.89  0.76
     19.  500  2.49  0.50
  10.  Coles Dried Mixed Fruit  20.  375  2.39  0.64
     21.  1,000  6.27  0.63
  11.  Coles Prunes Pitted  22.  250  2.78  1.11
     23.  500  5.28  1.06
  12.  Coles Sultanas Sun Dried  24.  375  2.62  0.70
     25.  500  3.26  0.65
  13.  Sunbeam Currants Sundried  26.  300  3.43  1.14
     27.  1,000  10.20  1.02
  14.  Sunbeam Mixed Fruit Dried  28.  375  3.98  1.06
     29.  1,000  7.90  0.79
 15.  Sunbeam  Raisins  Seeded  30.  375  4.31  1.15
     31.  1,000  10.78  1.08
  16.  Sunbeam Sultanas Sundried  32.  250  2.94  1.18
     33.  375  3.05  0.81
     34.  500  3.89  0.78
     35.  1,000  7.34  0.73
 17.  Sunsweet  Prunes  Pitted 36.  200  2.76  1.38
     37.  500  6.42  1.28
  18.  Trident Dates Pitted  38.  250  2.16  0.86
     39.  500  3.59  0.72
  19.  Lucky Almond Meal  40.  200  6.49  3.25
     41.  400  10.89  2.72
  20.  Lucky Almonds Natural  42.  110  4.13  3.75
     43.  350  8.16  2.33
     44.  500  10.89  2.18
 21.  Lucky  Brazil  Nuts  45.  150  4.13  2.75
         46.  350  8.16  2.33
  22.  Riverside All Australian Pecan Halves  47.  110  3.04  2.76
     48.  180  4.89  2.72
Biscuits 23.  Oreo  Biscuits  49.  150  2.00  1.33
     50.  300  3.46  1.15
  24.  Unibic Sponge Finger Savoiardi Biscuits  51.  250  4.18  1.67
     52.  500  5.91  1.18
Cereal  25.  Carman's Muesli Original Fruit Free  53.  500  5.34  1.07
     54.  750  7.48  1.00
  26.  Coles Cereal Corn Flakes  55.  500  2.50  0.50
     56.  800  3.79  0.47   18 
 
  27.  Coles Cereal Wheat Biscuits  57.  750  3.73  0.50
     58.  1,125  5.13  0.46
  28.  Kellogg’s Cereal All Bran Original  59.  350  4.27  1.22
     60.  655  5.79  0.88
  29.  Kellogg’s Cereal Corn Flakes  61.  280  2.92  1.04
     62.  460  3.73  0.81
     63.  775  6.21  0.80
  30.  Kellogg’s Cereal Coco Pops  64.  450  5.59  1.24
     65.  735  8.03  1.09
  31.  Kellogg’s Cereal Crunchy Nut Corn Flakes  66.  430  5.34  1.24
     67.  710  7.95  1.12
  32.  Kellogg’s Cereal Just Right Original  68.  560  6.44  1.15
     69.  890  8.34  0.94
  33.  Kellogg’s Cereal Nutri Grain  70.  345  5.34  1.55
     71.  560  6.62  1.18
     72.  805  8.55  1.06
  34.  Kellogg’s Cereal Rice Bubbles  73.  300  4.38  1.46
     74.  490  5.61  1.14
  35.  Kellogg’s Cereal Special K  75.  360  5.25  1.46
     76.  600  7.19  1.20
  36.  Kellogg’s Cereal Sultana Bran  77.  500  5.81  1.16
     78.  820  7.35  0.90
  37.  Kellogg’s Cereal Sultana Bran Buds  79.  340  5.34  1.57
     80.  600  8.55  1.43
 38.  Nestle  Milo  Cereal  81.  350  5.23  1.49
     82.  700  5.00  0.71
  39.  Norganic Crunchola Cereal Apple Blueberry  83.  450  6.41  1.42
     84.  750  9.62  1.28
  40.  Norganic Crunchola Cereal Apple Cinnamon  85.  450  6.41  1.42
     86.  750  9.62  1.28
  41.  Sanitarium Cereal Light N Tasty Berry  87.  620  6.09  0.98
     88.  900  8.55  0.95
  42.  Sanitarium Light N Tasty Macadamia & Honey  89.  115  1.49  1.30
     90.  620  6.09  0.98
     91.  900  8.55  0.95
  43.  Sanitarium Weet Bix  92.  375  2.77  0.74
     93.  750  4.91  0.65
         94.  1,000  5.56  0.56
  44.  Uncle Toby's Oats Quick  95.  500  3.73  0.75
     96.  1,000  6.28  0.63
  45.  Uncle Toby's Oats Traditional  97.  500  3.73  0.75
     98.  1,000  6.28  0.63
  46.  Uncle Toby's Plus Cereal Antioxidant Lift  99.  460  5.34  1.16
     100.  700  5.00  0.71
  47.  Uncle Toby's Plus Cereal Fibre Lift  101.  460  5.34  1.16
     102.  710  5.00  0.70
  48.  Uncle Toby's VitaBrits Cereal  103.  375  2.88  0.77
     104.  750  4.82  0.64
     105.  1,000  5.34  0.53
Frozen            
Carrots & Corn  49.  Birds Eye Corn Kernels Sweet Extra Juicy  106.  500  2.75  0.55
     107.  1,000  5.05  0.51
  50.  Coles Australian Corn Cobs  108.  600  2.99  0.50
     109.  1,000  4.16  0.42
  51.  Coles Australian Corn Kernels  110.  500  2.45  0.49
     111.  1,000  4.27  0.43
Mixed Vegetables  52.  Birds Eye Cntry Hvst Carrots, Caulifl. & Broccoli  112.  500  2.93  0.59
     113.  1,000  5.01  0.50
  53.  Coles Australian Carrots, Peas & Corn  114.  500  2.56  0.51
     115.  1,000  4.27  0.43
  54.  Coles Australian Mixed Vegetables  116.  500  2.23  0.45
     117.  1,000  4.16  0.42
Peas & Beans  55.  Birds Eye Peas  118.  500  2.18  0.44
     119.  1,000  4.19  0.42
  56.  Coles Australian Beans Sliced  120.  500  2.13  0.43
     121.  1,000  3.84  0.38
  57.  Coles Australian Peas  122.  500  1.92  0.38
     123.  1,000  3.14  0.31
  58.  McCain Peas Baby Frozen  124.  500  2.32  0.46
     125.  1,000  4.16  0.42
Other Vegetables  59.  Birds Eye Spinach Portions  126.  250  2.13  0.85
     127.  450  3.73  0.83
Convenience Meals  60.  Coles Lasagne Béchamel Beef  128.  400  4.80  1.20
     129.  1,000  6.82  0.68
  61.  McCain (Frozen Meal) Lasagne  130.  1,000  10.97  1.10   19 
 
     131.  2,000  14.97  0.75
Fish & Seafood  62.  Birds Eye Fish Fingers  132.  375  5.34  1.42
     133.  1,000  9.63  0.96
  63.  Coles Fish Fillets Crumbed  134.  425  7.27  1.71
     135.  1,000  14.97  1.50
  64.  Coles Fish Fillets Crumbed Lemon  136.  425  7.27  1.71
     137.  1,000  14.97  1.50
Party Snacks  65.  Patties Party Pies  138.  560  6.11  1.09
     139.  1,120  11.64  1.04
Pies & Pasties  66.  Coles Smart Buy Meat Pie  140.  150  0.75  0.50
         141.  450  2.66  0.59
  67.  Four'N Twenty Traditional Meat Pies  142.  700  7.04  1.01
     143.  1,050  8.75  0.83
 68.  Scotts  Meat  Pie  144.  150  1.09  0.73
     145.  900  6.29  0.70
Pastry  69.  Pampas Puff Pastry  146.  1,000  4.00  0.40
     147.  1,600  6.94  0.43
Poultry  70.  Steggles Turkey Breast Roast Frozen  148.  1,000  20.92  2.09
     149.  2,000  41.18  2.06
Dairy - Cheese            
Blocks & Wedges  71.  Bega So Light Vintage Cheese 25% Reduced Fat  150.  250  5.19  2.08
     151.  500  7.91  1.58
  72.  Bega Strong & Bitey Cheese Vintage  152.  250  5.19  2.08
     153.  500  7.80  1.56
  73.  Bega Tasty Cheese  154.  250  4.78  1.91
     155.  500  7.54  1.51
     156.  750  10.69  1.43
     157.  1,000  12.14  1.21
  74.  Capel Choice Mild Cheddar Cheese  158.  250  4.01  1.60
     159.  500  7.16  1.43
     160.  1,000  12.19  1.22
  75.  Capel Choice Tasty Cheddar Cheese  161.  250  4.01  1.60
     162.  500  7.16  1.43
     163.  1,000  12.19  1.22
  76.  Coles Cheese Block Vintage  164.  250  4.27  1.71
     165.  500  7.48  1.50
  77.  Coles Cheese Tasty  166.  250  4.06  1.62
     167.  500  6.73  1.35
     168.  1,000  11.01  1.10
  78.  Coles Cheese Tasty Extra  169.  250  4.06  1.62
     170.  500  6.73  1.35
  79.  Coles Cheese Tasty Lite  171.  250  4.06  1.62
     172.  500  6.73  1.35
     173.  1,000  11.01  1.10
  80.  Coles Colby Cheese  174.  250  4.06  1.62
     175.  500  6.73  1.35
  81.  Coles Smart Buy Tasty Cheese Block  176.  500  5.13  1.03
     177.  1,000  8.89  0.89
 82.  Coon  Tasty  Cheese  178.  250  4.48  1.79
     179.  500  7.37  1.47
  83.  Coon Tasty Cheese Light  180.  250  4.48  1.79
     181.  500  7.37  1.47
  84.  Mainland Cheese Extra Tasty Special Reserve  182.  200  4.87  2.44
     183.  400  7.54  1.89
 85.  Mainland  Colby  Cheese  184.  250  4.87  1.95
     185.  500  7.54  1.51
         186.  1,000  12.23  1.22
 86.  Mainland  Tasty  Cheese  187.  250  4.87  1.95
     188.  500  7.54  1.51
     189.  1,000  12.23  1.22
 87.  Mainland  Vintage  Cheese  190.  250  5.23  2.09
     191.  500  8.01  1.60
  88.  Watsonia Cheese Cheddar Matured  192.  250  4.07  1.63
     193.  500  7.28  1.46
     194.  1,000  12.54  1.25
  89.  Watsonia Cheese Cheddar Semi Matured  195.  250  4.07  1.63
     196.  500  7.28  1.46
     197.  1,000  12.54  1.25
Cottage & Cream  90.  Bulla Cottage Cheese Plain Low Fat  198.  200  2.77  1.39
     199.  500  5.34  1.07
  91.  Coles Cottage Cheese Lite  200.  200  1.91  0.96
     201.  500  4.59  0.92
  92.  Kraft Philadelphia Cream Cheese  202.  250  4.26  1.70
     203.  500  8.01  1.60
  93.  Weight Watchers Cottage Cheese  204.  250  3.35  1.34   20 
 
     205.  500  5.98  1.20
Gourmet & Specialty  94.  Aussie Gold Camembert Cheese  206.  125  4.48  3.58
     207.  250  7.48  2.99
  95.  Jindi Brie Cheese  208.  125  5.34  4.27
     209.  200  9.62  4.81
  96.  South Cape Cheese Brie  210.  110  4.80  4.36
     211.  200  8.55  4.28
  97.  Tasman Heritage Brie  212.  125  4.70  3.76
     213.  140  6.09  4.35
     214.  250  10.15  4.06
  98.  Perfect Italiano Ricotta Cheese Light  215.  250  3.19  1.28
     216.  500  5.34  1.07
  99.  Perfect Italiano Ricotta Cheese Smooth  217.  250  3.19  1.28
     218.  500  5.34  1.07
Grated  100.  Coles Cheese Shredded Mozzarella  219.  250  4.38  1.75
     220.  500  6.40  1.28
  101.  Coon Tasty Cheese Shredded  221.  250  4.62  1.85
     222.  500  6.94  1.39
  102.  Mainland Mozzarella Cheese Grated  223.  250  5.16  2.06
     224.  500  6.41  1.28
  103.  Mainland Tasty Cheese Grated  225.  250  5.16  2.06
     226.  500  7.76  1.55
  104.  Mainland Tasty Cheese Grated Light  227.  250  5.16  2.06
     228.  500  7.76  1.55
  105.  Perfect Italiano Mozzarella Cheese Grated  229.  250  5.23  2.09
     230.  500  6.55  1.31
  106.  Perfect Italiano Parmesan Cheese Shredded  231.  125  3.95  3.16
         232.  250  5.23  2.09
Slices  107.  Bega Natural Cheese Slices Tasty  233.  250  5.34  2.14
     234.  500  8.76  1.75
  108.  Bega Super Cheese Slices Individ. Wrapped  235.  250  3.30  1.32
     236.  500  6.41  1.28
  109.  Bega Super Slim Cheese Slices Individ. Wrapped  237.  250  3.30  1.32
     238.  500  6.41  1.28
  110.  Coon Tasty Cheese Slices  239.  250  5.17  2.07
     240.  500  9.19  1.84
     241.  750  11.76  1.57
  111.  Kraft Singles Cheese Slices 97% Fat Free  242.  205  3.20  1.56
     243.  410  2.84  0.69
  112.  Kraft Singles Cheese Slices Light  244.  250  3.20  1.28
     245.  500  2.84  0.57
     246.  750  8.43  1.12
  113.  Kraft Singles Cheese Slices Original  247.  250  3.20  1.28
     248.  500  2.84  0.57
     249.  750  8.43  1.12
Snack Size  114.  Bega Cheese Stringers  250.  80  2.89  3.61
     251.  160  5.34  3.34
     252.  240  7.49  3.12
  115.  Bel Mini Cheese Babybel  253.  100  4.27  4.27
     254.  200  8.12  4.06
  116.  Mainland On The Go Spcl Res. & Water Crackers  255.  50  2.44  4.88
     256.  120  5.34  4.45
  117.  Mainland On The Go Tasty & Water Crackers  257.  50  2.44  4.88
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